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ness world must adapt to the Texas Gulf Sulphur restrictions and re-
quirements.
Stephen Lewis Atkinson
Robert Mason Steptoe, Jr.
Torts---Landowner's Standard of Care Based on
Ordinary Principles of Negligence
Plaintiff, a social guest of defendant, suffered injury when a
cracked porcelain handle of a bathroom water faucet broke in his
hand. Defendant had been aware of the defective condition of the
handle for several weeks but failed to warn the plaintiff. There
was no showing that the faucet handle crack was obvious. De-
fendant's motion for a summary judgment was sustained, and plaintiff
appealed. Held, reversed. The proper test of liability to be applied
to the possessor of land is whether, in the management of his pro-
perty, he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability
of injuries to others. The plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee,
or invitee is not determinative of the occupier's liability. The two
dissenting justices contended that liability based on the historical
visitor distinctions provided stability and predictability to this area
of the law, and supplied a workable approach to the problems in-
volved. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561
(1968).
This case is significant since it abolishes in California the old
tests for standard of care owed to a trespasser, a licensee, and an
invitee, and establishes a single new test based on ordinary principles
of negligence. Analysis of the decision requires consideration of
three aspects of the problem raised by it: the history of the visitor
distinctions, the value of the visitor distinctions today and the
validity of the new California test.
I. HISTORY OF THE VISITOR DISTINCTIONS
The privileged position of the landowner' was taken for granted
when the distinctions in the liability of the occupier were developed
in the middle of the nineteenth century. Several factors account for
this treatment. At that time the principle that a man should be
I The term "landowner" is used interchangeably in this comment with
"occupier," "occupant," and "possessor." These terms all refer to that person
who is in possession and control of the premises.
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responsible for damage he should have foreseen was inconceivable
as a general principle of liability and only hesitatingly recognized.2
The limited extent of liability for reasonably foreseeable damage
made it inevitable that courts would only cautiously impose new
liabilities on the landowner. Moreover, even if courts were prepared
to apply the reasonable man standard to the liability of the land-
owner, they were not willing to subject him to the verdict of a jury
usually composed of potential visitors to property rather than
landowners.3 Consequently, the judges, by devising legal categories
of visitors to whom landowners owed different standards of conduct,
limited juries to the consideration of whether the particular standard
of conduct required had in fact been followed.4 Thus, at its inception
the resort to classifying visitors on land was an administrative de-
vice.
In addition to the fear of the jury's power, the mid-Victorian
judge was also influenced by the belief that liability could be estab-
lished only by existing legal principles.' In an effort to make the
negligence concept more adaptable to the landowner's control, the
courts used, as the foundation on which to build the whole new
scheme of categories, the early common law trespass idea-the
landowner owes the trespasser no duty other than not to intentionally
harm him.6 Upon this foundation, four existing principles of law
were extended by the judges in favor of visitors to property. These
principles involved nuisance on the highway, contractual liability,
fraudulent conduct and the distinction between wrongs of commis-
sion and wrongs of omission.7
2 Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and
Trespassers, 69 L.Q. Rnv. 182, 184 (1953).
3 This feeling is illustrated in Toomey v. London & Brighton Ry., 140
Eng. Rep. 694, 696 (1857), when the judge in holding, as a matter of law,
there was no evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury said:
"[E]very person who has had any experience in courts of justice knows very
well that a case of this sort against a railway company could only be submitted
to a jury with one result."4 Marsh, supra note 2, at 186.5 1d.
6 Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 CoLum. L. REv.
255, 271 & n.56 (1929).
7 Marsh, supra note 2, at 186-98.
Some protection was afforded to a user of the highway if his presence
on the occupier's land could be explained as incidental to his rights on the
highway. If his presence could not be so explained, he was assumed to be a
trespasser, in respect of which there was no liability except when the injury
was intentionally inflicted by direct physical action, Deane v. Clayton, 129
Eng. Rep. 196 (1817), or by setting up a dangerous device such as a spring-
gun or a man-trap, Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
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I1 VALUE OF VISITOR DISTINCTIONS TODAY
American law has adopted from English law the three classifica-
tions of visitors (trespasser, licensee, invitee) to property. General-
ly speaking a trespasser is one who enters or remains upon an-
other's land without having a privilege to do so; a licensee may be
generally defined as one who is privileged to enter or remain upon
land with the possessor's consent; an invitee is a business visitor
who is invited or allowed to enter or remain on the land for a
direct or indirect business purpose.8
The establishment of a legal standard of conduct by the occupier
towards visitors on his premises involves a reconciliation of two
conflicting social values: the sanctity of landed property, and the
protection of individuals from physical injury caused by another's
negligence. It has been shown in the preceding discussion that the
distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers, with their
accompanying legal doctrines, did not arise as the result of the
careful weighing of these conflicting values, but as the result of
If the entry upon the land was contractual in nature or somehow involved
the occupier's consent, liability could be imposed if the occupier failed to use
reasonable care. This influence of contractual liability is shown by the
language used in Intermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274, 287 (1866): 'This
protection [of the invitee] does not depend upon the fact of a contract being
entered into in the way of the shopkeeper's business during the stay of the
customer, but upon the fact that the customer has come into the shop in
pursuance of a tacit invitation given by the shopkeeper, with a view to
business which concerns himself." One unfortunate consequence of the
contractual analogy was the distinction drawn between an invitee and a
licensee. The licensee category did not develop as a separately conceived
group, but rather as a residual category for those not fortunate enough
to be termed invitees. The residual licensee class could only claim the limited
protection afforded to a trespasser. Marsh, supra note 2, at 192-93. The
earliest case of private invitation was that of a social guest. Southcote v.
Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1856). Ever since, social guests have been
regarded as licensees.
An occupier might also be liable for misfeasance (and later nonfeasance)
amounting to fraud. The duty to disclose known dangers was borrowed
partly from the Roman law as to gratuitous contracts, Blakemore v. Bristol
& Exeter Ry., 120 Eng. Rep. 385, 391 (1858), and partly from English cases
in contract concerned with a shipper's duty to disclose the character of a
dangerous cargo to ship-owners. Williams v. East India Co., 102 Eng. Rep.
571, 574 (1802).
In Gautret v. Egerton, L.R. 2 C.P. 371, 375 (1867), the judge said,
"No action will lie against a spiteful man, who, seeing another running into
a position of danger, merely omits to warn him. To bring this case within
the category of actionable negligence, some wrongful act must be shown, or
a breach of some positive duty ....... Duty could only be found in two
circumstances: 1. where the visitor had entered on the business, or for the
benefit, of the occupier; 2. where there had been fraudulent conduct on the
part of the occupier.
8 RESTATEMENT (SpCOND) OF TORTS §§ 329, 330, 332 (1965).
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various attempts by mid-Victorian courts to extend certain principles
of law in favor of visitors to property." It has been said that these
attempts resulted in the classification of intruders on land into
"multiple useless and confusing categories.'" 0
An analysis of some methods used to extend the occupier's
liability illustrates the desire to mitigate the harsh results of the
traditional approach of classifying visitors on another's property. A
number of jurisdictions meet the argument that a trespasser is a
wrongdoer to whom no duty is owed by a similar moral argument.
It is contended that the landowner is also a wrongdoer by placing
dangerous and attractive machinery on his land, thereby "inviting"
young children into his "traps."" Other courts use the "dangerous
instrumentality" doctrine to extend the landowner's liability. In
commenting on the "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals defined the care to be used to
protect children upon such property as the "care of an ordinarily
prudent and cautious person under similar circumstances."' 2 What
constitutes a "dangerous instrumentality" is often a difficult ques-
tion. Even an artificial pool of water may qualify if there exists in
connection with it a hidden danger or trap."3
Another method of extending the occupier's liability has been to
find some way to fit the social guest (licensee) into the protected
invitee category. Two popular shoehorns are the economic benefit
test, 14 which West Virginia applies, 5 and the invitation test. 6
Courts often strain to find some benefit or invitation by which the
social guest may be elevated to the invitee status. The widely accept-
9 Marsh, supra note 2, at 198.
10 Green, supra note 6, at 271.
11 Id. This approach is often termed the "turntable" or "attractive nuis-
ance" doctrine. See Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
t 2 Waddell v. New River Co., 141 W. Va. 880, 885, 93 S.E.2d 473, 476(1956).
13 Hatten v. Mason Realty Co., 148 W. Va. 380, 387, 135 S.E.2d 236,
241 (1964).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). Using the term
"business visitor" to describe one type of invitee, the RESTATEmENT defines
a business visitor as "a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor of the land."
,- Morgan v. Price, 151 W. Va. 158, 164, 150 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1966).
"A person is an invitee when for purposes connected with the business con-
ducted on the premises he enters or uses a place of business."
,6 Supra note 14. A public invitee is any person "who is invited to
enter or remain on the land as a member of the public for a purpose for
which the land is held open to the public."
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ed invitation theory results in many visitors, from whose presence
no shadow of economic benefit may be found, being classed as
invitees." Even where an invitation cannot be found, protection
is sometimes extended against the occupier's active negligence when
he knows of the danger."5
The compulsion on the courts to fit the individual into a desired
classification makes judgment depend on one factor alone, even
though many factors which should have some bearing on the judg-
ment are present in nearly all cases. In contrast to this, the Rowland
case lists some of the considerations to be balanced, such as the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the certainty of plaintiff's
injury, and the proximity of defendant's conduct with the injury
sustained. Other factors deserving consideration include the de-
sirability of extending liability in view of the burden on defendant
and the effect on the community, and the availability, in terms of
cost and prevalence, of insurance for the risk involved.' 9
II. VALIDITY OF THE NEW CALIFORNuA TEST
The decision in Rowland marks a long anticipated application
of the fundamental rule of liability for negligence in occupier liability
cases. In shifting the burden of responsibility upon the wrongdoer,
liability is imposed commensurate with the particular circumstances
involved.20 The flexibility thus attained enhances the prospect of a
17 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 61, at 399 (3d ed. 1964).
'
8 Hansen v. Richey, 46 Cal. Rtpr. 909, 913 (1965). See Holcome v.
Buckland, 130 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1942), for a good discussion of West
Virginia decisions concerning the occupant's duty to licensees. The court
made this observation: "In all of these formulae there is manifest an effort
on the part of the courts to express the idea that a licensee is not entirely
outside the pale of the protection of the law and that situations frequently
occur in which the ordinary requirements of humanity give rise to a duty on
the part of an occupant of premises to look out for the safety of one who
comes upon the premises with the permission of the occupant." Holcome v.
Buckland, supra at 547. The court in Holcome held that a possessor of land
is liable for bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or arti-
ficial condition thereon only if he knows of the condition and realizes that
it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has reason to believe that they
will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and invites or permits
them to enter or remain on the land, without exercising reasonable care to
make the condition safe or to warn them of the risk involved. See also Perkins
v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co., 236 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.W. Va. 1964), and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965).
19 Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (1968).
20 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 313, 319 (1966). The validity of this purpose
has been expressly acknowledged in West Virginia. Waddell v. New River Co.,
141 W. Va. 880, 885, 93 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1956): "Reasonable care and
negligence are relative terms, and the degree of care required must be com-
mensurate with the dangers to be avoided."
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desirable result. By classifying visitors on property and applying
fixed principles of liability toward each classification, flexibility
is thwarted. In applying the negligence formula of "reasonable care
under the circumstances," it may be argued that both human rights
and property rights receive a maximum of balanced protection.
Not only would the judge and the jury have the same powers under
the negligence formula as they now have under the confusing
categorical approach, but also they would seemingly enjoy a much
greater opportunity for exercising their powers rationally.2 How-
ever, it may be argued that the more flexibility a court has, the
greater is its opportunity to act arbitrarily, thus lessening the prospect
of certainty and uniformity in the administration of justice. This
was the position adopted by the dissenting judges in Rowland.
Those favoring the categorical approach argue that a social guest
must take the premises as he finds them. However, the majority
opinion in Rowland takes the position that a man's life or limb
does not become less worthy of protection by the law, nor a loss
less worthy of compensation under the law because one comes upon
another's property without permission or with permission but with-
out a business purpose. The Rowland court pointed out that focus-
ing upon the injured party's status to determine if the landowner
has a duty of care is contrary to our modem social mores and
humanitarian values.22 Similarly, one commentator has argued that
social guest has good reason to expect that his host will make condi-
tions safe or warn him of hidden dangers. 3
A common argument of those opposed to the use of the "reason-
able man" test of landowner's liability is that its application will
cause a flood of litigation. A primary reason underlying the "flood-
gate" argument is the fear that by applying ordinary principles
of negligence, the occupant will be made an insurer of his vistor's
safety. However, it may be well argued that this fear is unfounded
since the plaintiff must first prove the defendant owed him some
legal duty which he violated. Sustaining an injury on another's pre-
mises is not in itself evidence of such a violation.24 Also, no warning
21 Green, supra note 6, at 275.
22 Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (1968).
23 McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons
Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. Rnv. 45, 58 (1936).24 See 31 TENN. L. Rav. 485 (1964).
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is required where the dangerous condition is obvious to one exercis-
ing reasonable care for his own safety."
That the abolition of the historical distinctions should be a legisla-
tive, rather than a judicial concern, is perhaps the most formidable
argument of those opposed to the abolition. Critics of this argument
point out that the very strength of the common law has been in
its ability to expand and meet the demands of the age. It is contend-
ed that the demands of our modern society argue strongly for the
abolition of the categorical standard of care and the substitution of
one uniform duty of care to be tested under general principles of
negligence.2" However, in West Virginia, as well as other states, it
is provided by constitutional and statutory provisions that the com-
mon law shall continue in force "until altered or repealed by the
legislature."27
The California decision is not a radical departure from the pre-
vailing position of other courts. 8 The ingenious methods used by
today's courts to protect a visitor to property ("active negligence,"
"trap" doctrine, expansion of "invitee" class, etc.) evidence the
direction in which the courts have moved. The reliance, however, on
past distinctions and ancient terminology has prevented this move-
ment from being orderly and uniform. In an attempt to protect
individuals from the unfortunate consequences of the confusing
traditional immunities, more categories and exceptions have been
promulgated resulting in even more confusion. The judicial process
does not require either the confusion or the bad habits resulting
from the use of ancient phraseology, which misrepresents all that
is being done." Douglas Alan Cornelius
2 5 Nuckoles v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 248 F. Supp. 164, 165 (W.D. Va.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 372 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1967).
2 6 See Mo. L. REv. 186, 200 (1957).
27 W. VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 21, and W. VA. CoDE ch. 2, art. 1, § 1
(Michie 1966). The Supreme Court of Appeals is sternly enjoined to leave
drastic changes in the common law to the legislature. Cunningham v. County
Court, 148 W. Va. 303, 308, 134 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1964). To modify a
common law doctrine requires legislative action. Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp.,
149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965).28 Some courts in particular situations have rejected the rigid common
law classifications and approached the duty issue on the basis of ordinary
principles of negligence. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104, 443
P.2d 561, 568 (1968) (citing cases). One case cited is Taylor v. New Jersey
Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 463, 126 A.2d 313, 317 (1956) which con-
tains the following statement: "In modern times the immunities have rightly,
though gradually, been giving way to the overriding social view that where
there is foreseeability of substantial harm landowners, as well as other
members of society, should generally be subjected to a reasonable duty of
care to avoid it."29 Green, supra note 6, at 275.
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